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In a former article in this Journal' I pointed out that one great
difference between the American system of registration of title to land
and the majority of the systems in the British Empire is that under the
American system, as illustrated by the provisions of the Draft Uniform
Act of 1914, "the policy is deliberately adopted of allowing all trans-
actions to be carried out by means of ordinary instruments." The
purpose of the present article is to set forth some of the possible
results of this policy on the juridical theory and the practical working
of registration of title.
The subject of transactions with registered land subsequently to its
initial registration does not seem to have come up for decision or even
discussion in American cases. Niblack says, in an article in this
Journal2:
"the courts were content to pass only on the validity of the original
registration under a decree in a contested suit, leaving subsequent
transfers of the property by the sole act of the registrar entirely out
of consideration."
Of the systems belonging to the British Empire-those in Nova
Scotia, Ceylon, East Africa, Sudan, British Honduras and British
Columbia-which do not insist on the use of instruments of prescribed
form in registered transactions, British Columbia is the only one whose
law reports contain any cases on the subject, and even of these there
are not many. An exception to the general form of statutory instru-
ment has been engrafted on the English and Irish systems, viz., the
requirement that these shall be under seal. In all cases where the
instrument of assurance-or rather the instrument on the faith of
which assurance of the land is to be effected by appropriate entries on
the register-is a deed, and not merely an instrument under hand,
undue efficacy is apt to be attributed to the instrument itself and less
than its proper efficacy to the registration of the transaction.
The difference between registration statutes that provide for the
compulsory use of instruments in prescribed or statutory form, and
those that do not, is perhaps not apparent at first sight. The impor-
tance of the presence or absence of this one provision is due to the
circumstance that its presence in or absence 'from any particular statute
'Registration of Title to Land (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5I, 56.
'Pivotal Points in the Torrens System (r915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 274, 279.
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is, as a matter of fact, always accompanied by other differences, so that
registration statutes under which statutory instruments must be used
for registered transactions differ from those under which ordinary
instruments may be used in other respects also. These other points of
difference will be found to be of even greater importance than the mere
use of an instrument in one or another form.
Both classes of statutes-those that do, and those that do not, insist
on the use of statutory instruments-agree in making registration
essential for effecting any complete assurance of the land.3 Notwith-
standing considerable difference in detail and in form of enactment,
the provision in the American Draft Uniform Act of 1914, requiring
all transactions to be registered as a condition of complete validity,
may be taken as broadly typical of the corresponding enactment in
British statutes. This provision is contained in and forms part of
section 47 which is as follows:
"Except as otherwise specially provided by this Act, registered land
and ownership therein shall be subject to the same rights, burdens and
incidents as unregistered land, and may be dealt with by the owner, and
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, in the same manner as
if it had not been registered. But registration shall be the only opera-
tive act to transfer or affect the title to registered land, and shall date
from the time the writing, instrument, or record to be registered is
duly filed and entered in the office of the proper registrar. Subject to
the provisions of section 44, no voluntary nor involuntary transaction
shall affect the title to registered land until registered in accordance
with the provisions of this Act."
Section 44 of the Draft Uniform Act, referred to in this section,
enacts that the registered owner holds his land free from all adverse
claims, except those arising through fraud, forgery, unregistered stat-
utory rights, taxes, and occupation leases for a year. A similar enact-
ment forms part of nearly every registration statute.
Among statutes providing for the use of statutory forms, that of
Victoria (Australia) may be taken as typical: "The proprietor of
land, or of a lease, mortgage or charge, or of any estate, right or inter-
est therein respectively, may transfer the same by a transfer in one of
the forms in the seventh schedule"; so as to the right to make leases
and mortgages, etc.4 Under such enactments as these the statutory
method of transferring, leasing, etc., is compulsory in case of all
registered transactions, though in some jurisdictions discretion as to
insisting on exact compliance with prescribed forms is expressly
The exception may be neglected for the present purpose.
'See Victoria: Transfer of Land Act, 1915, secs. 121, 131, 145, printed in
Hogg, Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire (i9o8) 424, 426,
43o. Or see New South Wales: Real Property Act, x9oo, secs. 46, 53, 56,
printed in Hogg, Australian Torrens System (19o5) 1O8, 110, 11I.
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allowed to the registry office.5 This compulsory use of statutory
instruments is, however, confined to certain stated transactions, and
though the statutory instruments may be modified so as to embrace
most ordinary transactions, statutes of this class are very far from
requiring every instrument affecting land to be registered. No provi-
sion, for instance, is made for the registration of contracts for sale.
The provision, therefore, that "no instrument until registered
shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in any land," does not
apply to every instrument affecting land, but only to such instruments
as are registrable.
It therefore appears that systems of registration of title that make
provision for compulsory use of statutory instruments differ from
those that do not on two points: Only statutory instruments are regis-
trable, and ordinary instruments are not to be used for registrable
transactions. In the systems that make no provision for compulsory
use of statutory instruments, every instrument affecting land is regis-
trable, and ordinary instruments may, and in effect must, be used for
registrable transactions.
It will be found that systems in which no provision is made for com-
pulsory use of statutory forms differ from other systems in practical
working and juridical theory in the following ways: (i) All trans-
actions subsequent to initial registration will be in the nature of orig-
inal or initial applications for registration, and will require the exercise
of considerable judicial discretion on the part of the registry office;(2) professional assistance in the preparation of the simplest convey-
ance or mortgage will be almost indispensable; (3) the nature of the
rights conferred by the execution of a conveyance, mortgage, etc., and
pending registration will be difficult to determine, and will not neces-
sarily be governed by the analogy of other systems; (4) in the case
of mortgages the nature of the right conferred on the mortgagee both
before and after registration will be still more difficult to determine,
since the ordinary form of mortgage in fee will continue to be a "sham
conveyance" and will not be a statutory charge as under other systems.
The first two of these points may be dealt with together. The utility
of statutory forms of instruments lies in their saving the necessity of
legal assistance in the majority of simple transactions, and enabling
the registration to be carried out almost automatically, thus making the
function of the registry officers ministerial rather than judicial.
These advantages are lost where ordinary assurances continue to be
employed. The use of technical words, and of clauses conferring
'Crowley v. Templeton (1914, H. C. Austr.) 17 C. L. R. 457; and see Hogg,
Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire (i9o8) 21r.
"Victoria: Transfer of Land Act, 1915, sec. 61, printed in Hogg, ibid., 411;
New South Wales: Real Property Act, Igoo, sec. 4 , printed in Hogg, Australian
Torrens System (19o5) io6.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
express powers and embodying express covenants, is inseparable from
the ordinary form of conveyance, lease or mortgage. Such documents
cannot be prepared by a layman, and their meaning and effect cannot
be properly appreciated by laymen. A higher degree of legal equip-
ment will be required in the registry officers, and each transaction will
have to be much more closely scrutinized than if simple and well-
understood forms were employed. Every transaction will thus tend to
resemble an application for initial registration, in which the applicant's
title has to be investigated as on the sale and purchase of land. This
must inevitably impede the smooth and rapid working of the registry.
With respect to the nature of the rights conferred by ordinary con-
veyances or mortgages pending registration, the difficulty of determin-
ing what effect is to be given to an unregistered instrument, when
registration is made "the only operative act to transfer or affect the
title" to the land, is dual: Is the right conferred an actual interest in
the land? If so, is it an equitable interest, or if not an equitable
interest how is it to be described? There is no question about its being
a legal interest, for the legal interest or complete ownership is only
conferred by registration. The question resolves itself into the fol-
lowing alternatives: The unregistered instrument confers either an
equitable interest, or an interest that is neither legal nor equitable, or
else a mere personal right, like a chose in action, that is not an interest
in the land at all. But the last of these three alternatives may be
dismissed with little more than its mere statement. The view that an
unregistered instrument confers a mere personal right and nothing
that can be called an interest in land does not seem tenable on any
ground of principle or authority. The real choice lies between an
interest that can properly be described as equitable and one that cannot
be so described. To a great extent it is a matter of words, and if the
interest conferred by the unregistered instrument is not "equitable,"
how is it to be described?
In the majority of systems of the Australian type the view has gen-
erally been taken that interests conferred by recognized but unregis-
trable instruments, such as contracts for the sale of land, are true
equitable interests. The difficulty has been to find a suitable name for
interests conferred by unregistered registrable instruments. The
Australian case of Barry v. Heider8 illustrates this. This case arose
under the New South Wales registration statute. A statutory form
of transfer of land had been executed under circumstances that ren-
dered it voidable. While still unregistered the transferee executed a
mortgage over the land. Before either transfer or mortgage were
""Registration is the operative act to convey title." Tyler v. Court of Regis-
tration (19oo) 175 Mass. 7r, 8o, 55 N. E. 812.
8 (1914, H. C. Austr.) ig C. L. R. 197, under the New South Wales: Real
Property Act, Igoo, referred to in note 4, supra.
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registered proceedings were taken, by the transferor to set the transfer
aside. The mortgagee claimed to have such an interest in the land as
entitled him to keep his security as a charge on the land, notwithstand-
ing that the transferor was entitled to avoid the transfer as against the
transferee. This claim was upheld, on the ground that the unreg-
istered transfer conferred on the transferee an interest which he was
entitled to deal with, and the transfer being voidable only and not
void, the right of the mortgagee was better than and must be held
prior to the right of the original transferor. Two judgments were
delivered. That of Griffith, C. J. proceeded on the broad view that,
notwithstanding the enactment, "no instrument until registered
shall be effectual to pass any estate or interest in" land, "equitable
claims and interests are recognized by the" registration statute; the
equitable claim or right conferred by the unregistered transfer "was
in its nature assignable by any means appropriate to the assignment
of such an interest." The judgment of Isaacs, J. was more elaborate.
He admitted that under the enactment above quoted the registrable
instrument would not pass any estate, legal or equitable, but he pro-
ceeded to draw the distinction, referred to above, between "rights"
created by ordinary unregistrable instruments and those created by a
statutory registrable instrument. The learned judge said:
"The Land Transfer Act does not touch the form of contracts . . .
Consequently sec. 41, in denying effect to an instrument until regis-
tered, does not touch whatever rights are behind it. Parties may have
a right to have such an instrument executed and registered; and that
right, according to accepted rules of equity, is an estate or interest in
the land. Until that instrument is executed, sec. 41 cannot affect the
matter, and if the instrument is executed it is plain its inefficacy until
registered-that is, until statutory completion as an instrument of
title-cannot cut down or merge the pre-existing right which led to
its execution."
The position then was the same, "as to equitable remedies, as if the
land were not under the" registration statute. It would be in accord-
ance with the views expressed in Barry v. Heider by both judgments
to call the interest under the unregistered and registrable instrument a
"right to registration."
The Irish courts have gone much further in laying down the doc-
trine that "no estate, legal or equitable, passed from the transferor to
the transferee until registration."10  The words of the Irish enactment
are: "Until the transferee is registered as owner of the land (the
instrument of transfer) shall not confer on the transferee any estate
'Barry v. Heider, supra, 216.
*Pim v. Coyle (igo7) I L. R. Ir. 330. Other trial cases are cited in Hogg,
Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire (iso8) 114.
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in the lands."" In Pint v. Coyle the transferee neglected to register
until after a judgment-mortgage had been registered against the trans-
feror. It was held that the whole interest of the transferor was bound
by the registered judgment-mortgage in priority to any interest of the
transferee. The Irish statute, like the Australian statutes, makes no
provision for the general registration of instruments, such as contracts
for sale, etc. The interest of a person entitled -to be, but not yet, reg-
istered has been described in another Irish case as "an inchoate right
incapable of being defeated, and only waiting for an official duty to
be performed to become an absolute estate."'1 2 This right to registra-
tion would aptly be so described.
A system much nearer to the American system is that of British
Columbia, where the statutes contemplate the use of ordinary forms of
conveyance and provision is made for the registration of all instru-
ments affecting land.13 By section 104 of the 1911 statutes no instru-
ment purporting to affect land "shall pass any estate or interest either
at law or "in equity in such land until" registered; but the rights con-
ferred by the unregistered instrument are expressly made assignable,
and so must confer an interest of some kind in the land: "such instru-
ment shall confer on the person benefited thereby and on those claiming
through or under him, whether by descent, purchase or otherwise, the
right to apply to have the same registered." The unregistered instru-
ment thus confers, if not an equitable interest, a right to registration.
The above enactment has given rise to some difficulty and to differ-
ences in judicial opinion,'14 but in a case before the Privy Council the
enactment was construed quite literally.15 Howard v. Miller related
to a claim for specific performance of an agreement for the sale of
land. In the course)of the judgment delivered by Lord Parker it was
said:
"The agreement of June i, I9O8, was, in their Lordships' opinion, an
instrument purporting to affect land, and therefore, required registra-
tion under s. 74 of the Act. When so registered (but not before) it
would confer on the plaintiff Miller an equitable interest his title to
which would be registrable in the Register of Charges."
On the other hand the courts in British Columbia have in some cases
treated section 104 of the 1911 statute like any other mere registration
enactment and as being chiefly important in its effect on third parties'
"1 Ireland: Local Registration of Title Act, 18gi (54 and 55 Vict. ch. 66),
sec. 35.
'In re Furlong and Brogan's Contract (893) 3 L. R. Ir. I9l.
"British Columbia: Land Registry Act (Rev. St. 1911, ch. 127) and many
amending statutes. See Hogg, Registration of Title to Land throughout the
Empire (19o8) 12.
"Cases are cited in Hogg, ibid., 115.
"Howard v. Miller [1915] A. C. 318.
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rights. For instance, it has been held that a purchaser under a con-
veyance not yet registered can claim compensation for injury to the
land, notwithstanding section lO4:
"He was, as between himself and his vendor, the equitable owner of
the land when the damage was-done, and who, as between himself
and his vendor, was the one injured, and who, before taking theseproceedings, perfected his title by getting in the legal estate and com-
plying with sec. IO4."'1
So a conveyance made by way of security, when registered, was held
prior in interest to a creditor's deed of assignment executed after but
registered before the conveyance; on registration the conveyance was
held to relate back to the date of execution. 17
The cases cited-and particularly those under the British Columbia
statutes, support the view that, where statutory instruments are not
provided for, an instrument in the ordinary form of a deed would not,
until registered, pass any estate, legal or equitable. If that be so,
then a formal deed of conveyance or mortgage would have no greater
effect than a mere contract or agreement under hand. In the words
of another judgment of the Privy Counci1l'-"no instrument is effec-
tive to convey any estate in land unless it is registered, and therefore
the effect of the instrument rested in contract until registration." If
it be said that even under a contract for sale the purchaser would have
an equitable estate, the answer is that a contract for sale would equally
fail to "affect the title" until registered, so that in the end mere agree-
ments and formal conveyances would be on the same footing-they
would all "rest in contract" until registered, and the interest they
would confer would be best described as a right to registration, assign-
able and carrying with it many of the attributes of an equitable inter-
est. Although an interest in the land, it would not properly speaking
be the ordinary equitable estate or interest of English law. Possibly
statutes made as the American and British Columbia statutes-requir-
ing all instruments affecting land to be registered-have gone much
farther than the Australian statutes in abrogating the equitable estate
of English law, and have approximated to the doctrine of the civil law
as illustrated in South Africa. The following extract from a judg-
ment of the Privy Council shows the difference between English and
Roman-Dutch law:
"It is true that by the law of Natal a purchaser of land, though he may
have paid the price, is not until regular legal transfer (which includes
"Re North Vancouver City & Jackson (1914, B. C. Ct. App.) 27 West.
L. R. 456.
IT Westfall v. Stewart (19o7) 13 B. C. R. iii.
"Loke Yew v. Port Swettenham Rubber Co. [1913] A. C. 491. 500--under
the Federated Malay States statute, which goes to extreme lengths in prohibiting
non-statutory assurances.
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registration) the owner of the land, but is only one who has a claim
against the vendor. To speak of him as the true owner in the lan-
guage of an English Court of Equity, though the expression may be
used in speech for brevity's sake, is not correct . . . he is a creditor
of a very special kind-one who, in the absence of other claimants, has
a right to demand the very property in dispute."'19
The change in the form and theory of mortgages is one of the most
considerable of all the changes made by systems of registration of
title under which provision is made for the compulsory use of statutory
instruments. The statutory mortgage, thus introduced, takes the place
of the old sham conveyance of English law, and operates as a charge
on the land with statutory powers in the mortgagee for enforcing his
security. It is, however, "now generally recognized under the Eng-
lish system, although old forms are still used, that the real owner of
the land is the mortgagor, and the mortgage is a mere security for the
debt or obligation." 20 In those systems of registration which have not
introduced the statutory mortgage the "real ownership" of the mort-
gagor and the "mere security" of the mortgage by conveyance seem
necessarily to be recognized in an even stronger degree than in ordi-
nary English law. It has been said of the British Columbia system:
"A clear line of demarcation has been drawn between ownership of the
fee and of a charge," 21 and the statutes do in point of fact treat all
mortgages as charges only and not as conveyances of the ownership of
the land.
Nevertheless the continued use of the English form of mortgage-
a mere sham conveyance-must necessarily cause difficulty in a system
of registration of title. The systems that contemplate the use of the
ordinary mortgage in fee are also the systems that require all instru-
ments to be registered, so that the considerations applicable to con-
tracts for sale and conveyances, already referred to, will also apply to
mortgages so long as these remain unregistered. Until registration
they "rest in contract," and take effect as agreements only and not as
true mortgages giving rights in re; an unregistered mortgage-to
adopt the language of another Privy Council judgment which seems
applicable--"is valueless as a transfer or burdening instrument, but it
is good as a contract.
'22
The effect of the registration and the operation of the registered
mortgage is another matter altogether. The mortgage then takes
effect as a "burdening instrument," and the question to determine is
how far the registered ownership of the mortgagor is interfered with,
" Crowly v. Bergtheil [1899] A. C. 374, 390, 391.
"Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Douglas (1918, Can.) 57 S. C. R. 273.
'Bank of Hamilton v. Hartery (1918, Can.) 3 Weekly West. L 551.
=Haji Abdul Rahinan v. Mahomed Hassan [1917] A. C. 209, 215, a case on
the Federated Malay States statutes.
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apart from the effect of the mortgage as a charge-assuming of course
that the ordinary form of a mortgage in fee is used. Of the many
subsidiary questions that could be raised about this, one typical ques-
tion would be: How is the land to be assured to a purchaser in the
event of realization being necessary? Under the British Columbia
system the mortgage would be registered as a charge only, and the
mortgagee would not be registered as the owner of the land. This
would seem to be so equally under the American system. Notwith-
standing the words of conveyance in the mortgage then, the mortgagee
would not take the registered ownership, but this would remain in the
mortgagor. No statutory powers being conferred on the mortgagee,
he would be unable to vest the registered ownership in a purchaser
either by virtue of the conveyance to himself or of any power con-
ferred on him by the registration statute. Apparently a conveyance to
a purchaser could only be made in two ways: By virtue of an express
conventional power contained in the mortgage deed and so drawn as
to enable the mortgagee to authorize the registry office to pass the
registered ownership from the mortgagor to the purchaser; or under
an order of court made in proceedings taken ad hoc by the mortgagee.
Thus not only is the simple theory of the statutory charge, as exist-
ing in the Australian type of registration of title, absent from the
American and British Columbia types, but also the simpler method of
carrying out and enforcing mortgage transactions. While the theory
of mortgages is, if anything, made more difficult than even under
ordinary English law, the practical business of mortgaging land and
realizing the security is also made quite as troublesome and expensive
as in the case of unregistered land, and much more troublesome and
expensive than under systems of registration of title which provide for
a statutory mortgage by way of charge.
On all four points above referred to the system of employing ordi-
nary assurances for carrying out transactions with registered land
appears to be less satisfactory, both in juridical theory and in practical
convenience, than the system of employing special instruments in statu-
tory form.
